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sions of the several French constitutions of the nineteenth century and to tell much of the political activities of Monarchists and Bonapartists and Republicans. What he does not do, is to trace any "evolution". His political history is static, not dynamic.

To the person who desires to know what happened in French politics during the century preceding the Great War, the two volumes of M. Bourgeois can be recommended as trustworthy and even interesting. They are provided with convenient maps, bibliographies, and indices. But the person who wishes to discover why French politics took the curious turns they did, and how they were related to the larger industrial and intellectual life of France, will find a sphinxlike attitude on the part of M Bourgeois. Perhaps he knows, but he won't tell.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

Gambetta. By PAUL DESCHANEL. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920.—viii, 336 pp.

This biography first appeared appropriately at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and was translated into English while its author was serving his brief term as President of the French Republic. It is a eulogy of the patriot who in the ill-fated war of 1870-1871 personified French resistance to Germany and a graceful tribute to the statesman who introduced M. Deschanel himself to politics. But it is more than tribute and more than eulogy. It is good history and good literature. It is what a good biography should be.

It is brief but informing. It is clear and straightforward. It is at once sympathetic and critical. And in its preparation the author appears to have consulted all published works on Gambetta and to have made special use of parliamentary papers and of much unpublished correspondence, particularly letters written by Gambetta to Ranc, Barthélemy and Ruiz.

Only a few pages are devoted to Gambetta's early life and parliamentary career prior to 1870. The bulk of the book is divided into three approximately equal parts: the first, Gambetta's work as member of the Government of National Defense; the second, his achievements as deputy in the National Assembly from 1871 to 1875; the third, his rather hectic efforts as politician and premier between 1876 and his untimely death in 1882. The first part is in many respects the best: it throws some new light on the difficulties

which confronted Gambetta in those anxious winter months of 1870-1871 and, by admitting the general fallibility and some specific mistakes of the Provisional Minister of War and the Interior, it brings out in bold relief his truly heroic character.

Gambetta stands forth in this biography not essentially unlike the Gambetta of our college text-books. He is the same fiery, magnetic personality. He is the same practical politician, always compromising and always opportunist. He is the same devotee of democracy and science. Above all, he is the patriot, the republican, and the militarist. M. Deschanel emphasizes the fact that Gambetta was a great admirer of Richelieu and Mirabeau, having the same conception of government and the same taste for diplomacy, and that he liked neither Rousseau nor Robespierre. Over him Auguste Comte exercised an ever-increasing influence—Comte, who would have sacrificed progress to order, and hated instability and desired a strong central authority; who preached the glorification of science and the necessity of depending upon reason.

Writing when his countrymen were again fighting the Germans and when for the first time in generations they were maintaining the *union sacrée* of all domestic parties and factions, M. Deschanel occasionally goes out of his way to represent Gambetta as the heroic symbol of all Frenchmen. He minimizes Gambetta's anti-clericalism and likewise his anti-socialism. He dwells upon Gambetta's description of himself as "a worshipper at the shrine of Joan the Maid and an admirer and disciple of Voltaire" and speaks of him as dreaming "of coming to terms with Leo XIII, as he had come to terms with the Orleanists in order to make the Republic, as he had come to terms with the more old-fashioned Republicans in order to make them accept the Senate, and as he had come to terms with the Legitimists, and even the Bonapartists, in order to eject the Orleanists from the permanent Senatorial seats". But Gambetta's persistent speeches against clericalism and his savage attacks upon clericals are soft-pedaled or ignored. For a like purpose, we suppose, M. Deschanel has strained Gambetta's utterances in order to find some assurance of his interest in the social and economic problems of the workingmen. The only definite result is to show that Gambetta hoped "all classes of society" would share in "the benefits of civilization and science".

More clearly than ever before, Gambetta is depicted by M. Deschanel as typical of the bourgeois leaders of the Third French Republic: the champion of popular sovereignty and of the strongly

centralized state; the apostle of "science", radical in religion but conservative in economics; the spokesman for the middle class and the adversary of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the proletariat; the promoter of business interests and business prosperity; the staunch advocate of militarism, secret diplomacy, and imperialism; and as an orator "a volcano that belched forth slag and turbid smoke together with burning lava".

From hitherto unpublished correspondence of the years 1876-1877, it now appears that Gambetta made a curiously accurate forecast of the Great War, that sooner or later Europe was certain to be set ablaze, that Germany and Austria would be allied, that Turkey would probably reach an understanding with Austria, that, on the other side, an alliance would inevitably be formed between France, England and Russia, that the Latin peoples would be welded with the Slavs, and that perhaps the solution of the Franco-German quarrel would come to depend upon the Eastern Question. In this connection, it is not without interest that in 1874 Gambetta assailed the principle of nationality and declared his preference for "the European balance as conceived by diplomatists, at the end of the eighteenth century, before the Revolution". Gambetta was ahead of his time about war; about diplomacy, however, he belonged not with Woodrow Wilson but with Richelieu—and Clemenceau.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

French Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. By GRAHAM H. STUART. New York, The Century Company, 1921.—xi, 399 pp.

The author of this monograph is an instructor in the School of Political Science at Wisconsin University. Thanks to his studies in the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and to his residence in Paris during the years 1911 and 1913, he was well qualified for his chosen task. Although he has worked over well-tilled ground, he has nevertheless rendered a real service in succinctly setting forth in a single volume the salient features of French policy during the critical period preceding the outbreak of the Great War. In a sense he has done more, for during the period under review the foreign policy of France was so completely intertwined with the foreign policy of the several European states that he has necessarily given a fairly comprehensive picture of the meshwork of European diplomacy from Fashoda to Serajevo.

Equally important are the brief glimpses he gives of the real